I'm currently an Assistant Professor of philosophy at University at Buffalo
Before that, I was a Bersoff Fellow in the philosophy department at NYU
I've also studied at Brown University
, Tibet University
, and University of Michigan
. My research focuses on questions in virtue ethics, moral psychology, and Buddhist philosophy.
You can read an interview with me at 3:16
Please see my CV
for more information.
Abstract: What does it mean to be a morally good person? It can be tempting to think that it is simply a matter of performing certain actions and avoiding others. And yet, there is much more to moral character than our outward actions. We expect a good person to not only behave in certain ways, but also to experience the world in certain ways within. Pleasure, emotion, and attention are important parts of our moral character despite being involuntary inner states. Inner Virtue defends a theory of why and how such states are relevant to moral character: These states say something about what kind of person one is by manifesting our deepest cares and concerns.
Matilal's Metaethics (with Alex King, 2019) in Comparative Metaethics
An explanation of the metaethical pluralism defended by the prominent Indian philosopher Bimal Krishna Matilal (1935-1991). Drawing on a wide range of classical Indian sources Matilal argues that there is a genuinely universal morality, but also that there are multiple, often conflicting, moral frameworks.
Virtuous and Vicious Anger (2017) Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy
I defend an account of when and why anger is morally virtuous or vicious. I argue that anger is made morally virtuous or vicious by its underlying cares or concerns.
The Khache Phalu: A Translation and Interpretation (2017) Revue d'Etudes Tibétaines Vol. 39
An introduction and translation of a short ethical treatise written in Tibet in the late 18th century. The Khache Phalu is a text of ethical advice that references both Buddhist and Islamic thought. The translation was done with Tenzin Norbu Nangsal and also includes the full Tibetan text.
Imaginative Moral Development (2017) The Journal of Value Inquiry Vol.51 No.2
Following of Aristotle, many have thought that we cultivate virtues by doing the actions associated them. Drawing on techniques from Tibetan Buddhism, I offer several methods of moral development involving imagination and visualization rather than overt action.
Private Solidarity (2016) Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Vol.19 No.2
I argue that there are ways of acting in solidarity with others that are not public and do not aim at producing social change. I call this 'private solidarity' and defend an account of how it can be morally virtuous and what role it can have in moral development.
Patience and Perspective (2014) Philosophy East & West Vol.64 No.2
I defend a Buddhist-inspired account of how patience can count as a moral virtue, arguing that virtuous patience involves having a perspective on the place of our own desires and values among others and a sense of their relative importance.
Modesty as a Virtue of Attention (2013) Philosophical Review Vol.122 No.1
I argue that neither ignorance nor accuracy about the good qualities related to oneself is necessary for modesty. I then defend an attention-based account, claiming that what is necessary for modesty is to direct one’s attention in certain ways.
Bile & Bodhisattvas: Śāntideva on Justified Anger (2011) Journal of Buddhist Ethics Vol.18
I offer some objections to the 8th century Buddhist philosopher Śāntideva’s argument that anger towards those that harm us is never justified and argue that the text is best read as practical advice rather than as making philosophical claims about rational coherence.
Rationally Self-Ascribed Anti-Expertise (2010) Philosophical Studies Vol.151 No.3
I argue that self-ascribed anti-expertise, taking our own beliefs to be false, is not always irrational.
Tibetan Philosophy (2010) The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
A brief introduction to some of the major issues in Tibetan philosophy.